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INTERFACES OF STRATEGIC LEADERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK,
REVIEW, AND RESEARCH AGENDA
ABSTRACT

Interfaces are of growing importance for theorizing and testing the influence of
strategic leaders on firm behavior and actions. But despite their relevance and ubiquity, the
lack of a commonly accepted definition and unifying framework has hindered researchers’
ability to take stock, synthesize, and systematize extant knowledge. We first develop an
encompassing definition and organizing framework to review 122 prior studies across three
decades. We then chart promising directions for future research around three concepts central
to the framework and review: (a) why do interfaces occur? (b) what happens at these
interfaces? and (c) what are the impacts of interfaces? Together, the encompassing definition,
framework, review, and specific directions for future research provide the much needed
platform to agglutinate research and advance strategic leader interfaces as the next frontier of
strategic leadership research.

Keywords: strategic leader interfaces; top management teams; managers; executives;
interdependence; SLIs; strategy process
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Interfaces are the purposive contact points where the separate worlds of actors
intersect, and are central to facilitating the transfer of influence, information, and resources.
As organizations and entities within them become more porous, interfaces represent an
increasingly important phenomenon for management researchers. They are of special interest
to scholars of top executives because strategic leadership of organizations is a collective
endeavor entailing a complex web of relationships between executives and other parties. For
example, these interfaces include the CEO and the top management team (Georgakakis,
Heyden & Ruigrok, 2015; Klimoski & Koles, 2001; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin & Veiga, 2008),
CEO and board of directors (Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 2011), and the board of directors and
top management team (Kim, Burns & Prescott, 2009). They also include internal/external
stakeholders such as middle-managers, customers, investor analysts, and alliance partners.
Even as the major thrust of recent theorizing and testing on strategic leaders has been
on “who they are” and “what they do” (Hambrick, 1989), the importance of interfaces, or
“how they do it” has long been recognized in management research and practice. In the
Functions of the Executive, Barnard (1938: 215-216) discussed how one of the key functions
of the executive is to serve as channels of communication or “centers or points of
interconnection.” At least four of the ten managerial roles identified by Mintzberg (1973) –
liaison, disseminator, disturbance handler, and negotiator – center upon interfaces with
internal or external stakeholders. We also know, from everyday experience and our own
conversations with strategic leaders, that interfaces are the primary means by which the daily
work of strategic leaders is carried out. Consider the case of a new procurement executive
launching a new cost cutting initiative who requests that all contracts above a certain
threshold be sent to him for review. His decision to make this request by email, rather than
build rapport and trust with divisional management, resulted in him receiving no contracts
despite promises and commitments to the contrary.1 Or consider the case of Paul Austin, who
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was the CEO of Coca Cola from 1966 to 1980. His dis-agreeableness, emotional instability,
and confrontational style of engagement created a series of dysfunctional interfaces between
him and his top management team, and further down the chain of command (Peterson, Smith,
Martorana & Owens, 2003). The resulting culture of intimidation and conformity to
procedures inhibited the ability of Coca Cola to adapt to environmental changes, eventually
leading to disastrous financial performance (Peterson et al., 2003). In a recent issue of the
Harvard Business Review, Botelho, Powell, Kincaid and Wang (2017) describe how
“engaging with impact,” or achieving buy-in with employees and stakeholders can be one of
the hallmarks of successful CEOs. Using the example of the CEOs of the Children’s Hospital
of Philadelphia and Takeda Pharmaceuticals, they illustrate how successful CEOs develop an
astute understanding of stakeholders’ motivations and get people on board by aligning them
around value creation goals.
Despite their ubiquity and importance to the work of executives, research on
interfaces of strategic leaders, however, remains scattered and piecemeal, with no common
definition, framework, or nomenclature for integrating the core elements and dimensions, as
well as for synthesizing current understanding. Indeed, while a critical mass of relevant
studies has been marshalled (122 studies, with 70 published in the last ten years), no unifying
framework exists and there been no rallying call to study interfaces in a more coordinated and
accumulative fashion. Researchers in strategy, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and
organizational behavior have typically focused on a single interface at a time and from
different perspectives, without considering the possibility of a core set of variables that
characterize strategic leader interfaces (SLIs)—such as the environmental, task, and social
context in which they are embedded, function, and evolve. Said simply, even though several
“pixels” exist related to the specific elements, types, and levels of SLIs, we cannot yet discern
the “big picture” themes, identify uncharted territory, and highlight issues worthy of further
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examination. Thus, an integrative review is timely, necessary, and valuable, for not only
deducing stylized facts and identifying what is known and unknown, but also for guiding
future research toward an improved understanding and impactful contributions.
To that end, we first review existing definitions from multiple disciplines to advance
an encompassing definition of SLIs that synthesizes core elements. Drawing from the
definition and population of reviewed articles, we next iteratively develop a unifying
framework that interrelates the context, contact, and consequences of SLIs. Because the
framework holistically accommodates these three elements across all salient SLIs, we then
use it to provide a review, summary, and synthesis of more than three decades of relevant
research. The review brings into sharper focus the knowns and unknowns in the literature, as
well as the key ambiguities that have plagued research on SLIs. With the review as our
launching pad, we finally outline eight directions to extend existing conversations, stimulate
new conversations, and provide ways for new participants to join the conversation.
AN ENCOMPASSING DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC LEADER INTERFACES
Even though interfaces are a central fixture of executive life, and contributions
germane to specific interfaces exist, organizational researchers have yet to adopt a shared,
formal definition that captures the domain and boundaries of SLIs. Focusing on the CEO-top
management team interface, Klimoski and Koles (2001: 219) stressed that it is “critical to
examine the means by which the CEO leads the TMT and uses it to establish the CEO’s true
potential impact on overall organizational effectiveness.” Similarly, Zaccaro and Klimoski
(2002: 6) defined the interface as the various ways that “leadership and team processes
become intertwined so as to influence collective performance.” To Raes, Heijltjes, Glunk &
Roe (2011: 103), interfaces are “a place where the separate worlds of TMTs and [middle
managers] intersect, characterized by an alternation of episodes of contact during which
interaction or ‘interface processes’ take place, and periods of no contact.” Most recently,
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Bromiley and Rau (2016) reviewed a decade of studies on how social, behavioral, and
cognitive factors associated with the CEO-TMT interface influences strategic decision
making. However, they stop short of offering a definition or framework. Beyond these
contributions, others have considered selected aspects of the interface, such as the processes
that take place at the interface (e.g., Ling et al., 2008), or the nature of communication that
defines them (e.g., Cao, Simsek, & Zhang, 2010). In management studies broadly, Wren
(1967) defined an interface as the “contact point” between organizations which are
“interdependent and interacting” to work towards common goals. Interfaces have also been
used to examine inter-organizational relationships (Albers, Wohlgezogen, & Zajac, 2016),
inter-functional relationships (De Ruyter & Wetzels, 2000; Rau, Moslein, & Neyer, 2016),
cross-functional exchanges (Ashenbaum and Terpend, 2010), and modular systems (de Blok,
Meijboom, Luijkx, Schols & Schroeder, 2014).
We undertook three steps towards an encompassing definition: 1) a Web of Science
search of management journals to identify prior definitions in management research; 2)
examination of subject dictionaries/textbooks where the concept of interfaces is often used;
and 3) a cross-disciplinary article search of the Web of Science across ten disciplines.2 Based
on these searches, we compiled a representative list of definitions in Table 1.
--- Insert Table 1 about here --Synthesizing the insights across these disciplinary definitions, we propose a definition
of SLIs as the interdependent social situations in which the attributes, aspirations and/or
activities of strategic leaders and/or salient stakeholders come into contact with and
influence each other. We refer to strategic leaders as those with overall responsibility for
organizational functioning and performance (Hambrick, 1989). Stakeholders are actors,
groups of actors, or institutions that “can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the
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organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46)—via their power, legitimacy, or urgency in
relation to the firm’s strategy and performance (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
In defining SLIs in this encompassing manner, it is necessary to make some
qualifying statements regarding scope conditions and semantic relationships (Suddaby,
2010). First, SLIs consider more than one party at a time, and thus the combination of
different actor characteristics is crucial. This distinguishes interface studies from the larger
body of strategic leadership that focuses on intra-team processes and dynamics. Essentially,
SLIs capture direct contact among actors in which their attributes, aspirations, and activities
influence one another. Therefore, while strategic controls or administrative mechanisms (such
as compensation) can be a conduit through which influence propagates, interface studies must
explicitly capture “both sides of the ledger” in terms of the actors involved.
Second, because interfaces occur within the context of the strategic roles,
responsibilities, and activities of strategic leaders and stakeholders, they are consequential for
firm behavior, processes, actions, and/or outcomes. As such, they differ from other non-task
based, mundane, and routinized forms of contact and interaction that occur among leaders on
an almost daily basis – for example, routine encounters on the corridor or at the water cooler,
interactions in a social setting, and so forth. Although instances of contact, unless they are in
the context of strategic demands, roles, and responsibilities, and have consequences for
strategic processes, behaviors, or outcomes, they fall outside of the proposed definition.
Finally, a key aspect of the definition is the requirement of interdependence: “[a] state
by which entities have mutual reliance, determination, influence, and shared vested interests
in processes they use to accomplish work [strategic] activities” (Mathieu, Marks & Zaccaro,
2001: 293). Whether the purpose is to share information, transfer resources, or make
decisions, interfaces are the conduits by which dispersed actors, groups, and organizations
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become intertwined and shape collective outcomes. As such, the simple correlation or
coevolution of one leadership variable on another through processes such as cohort effects
does not constitute an interface, unless they are a consequence of the focal interaction.
Similarly, the interfaces of strategic leaders with technologies or processes are not included
unless they are a means to facilitate interdependent interactions.
METHOD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
With the above definition as the conceptual anchor, we turned to assessing the current
state of SLI research. To ensure a comprehensive review, we performed a multi-faceted
search encompassing four steps with additional verification checks (see Figure 1). First, using
the Web of Science we performed a forward-looking citation search of all the articles citing
Hambrick and Mason (1984) - the core framework for strategic leadership research over the
last three decades. We reviewed the title, abstract, and when necessary the main body of these
articles to identify relevant works – our intent at this stage was simply to exclude papers that
tangentially cite Hambrick and Mason (1984) but are not related to strategic leadership
research in any capacity. We located 2,476 articles using this approach. Second, we
performed a search using a combination of over 500 keywords in the Web of Science (details
of the specific keyword combinations are available upon request).3 This step uncovered 1,691
additional candidate articles for review for a total of 4,167 unique articles.
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --We then performed the third step of our procedure and analyzed the titles and
abstracts of all 4,167 articles found in the first two steps to determine whether: a) two or more
strategic leaders and / or stakeholders were present and engaged in contact, and b) whether
that contact had the potential to be consequential for firm behavior and/or outcomes.4 We
classified these papers into those that met both criteria and were retained for further review
(201 papers) and those that did not (3,966 articles). To achieve this classification, each of the
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4,167 articles was independently categorized by three authors using a coding guide. After
initial discussions, enhancements to the coding guide were made, and the remaining articles
coded. A subset of articles was used to assess inter-rater consistency—overall agreement was
91%, with a Fleiss’ Kappa of 84.5%, indicating strong absolute agreement (ICC (2, 1) = .85)
and consistency among the reviewers (ICC (2, 3) = .94).
Limiting our focus to the 201 articles selected for detailed review, we manually coded
all articles by extracting key quotes and findings and categorizing the articles using a scheme
consisting of 25 dimensions (available upon request), many of which are present in our
conceptual framework. In this final step, our third criterion (the presence of interdependence
between the parties) was applied. In total, 80 of the 202 coded articles were subsequently
excluded because they focused on non-interdependent parties (50 articles); considered
samples that did not include strategic leaders (8 articles); or for other reasons such as being a
book review or conference proceeding (22 articles). We also performed a verification check
that our population was comprehensive by reviewing the reference lists of the articles coded
for detailed review, locating one additional article for a final population of 122 articles.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW RESULTS
Drawing from the definition and population of reviewed articles, we iteratively
developed the framework (Figure 2) that holistically interrelates the context, contact, and
consequences of SLIs. The framework is intended as an organizing heuristic, rather than a
causal model. In this respect, it can be applied to different loci or units of analysis, whether
among leaders (inter-SLI), between leaders and internal stakeholders (internal-SLI), or
between leaders and external stakeholders (external-SLI). As with other strategic leadership
research, the framework is also primarily concerned with the consequences of SLIs for the
firm’s strategic choices and performance, rather than as an end in themselves.
--- Insert Figure 2 about here ---
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Briefly, the context represents the strategic imperatives and broader social dynamics
that give rise to SLIs by creating interdependencies, either among strategic leaders or
between strategic leaders and salient stakeholders. Contact refers to the key feature of our
definition that SLIs represent interdependent social situations in which the attributes,
activities, and aspirations of two or more actors intersect. Contact addresses key questions
such as what is intersected at the interface; what are the manifestations of interfaces; and
what is the nature of influence at the interface? Finally, consequences refer to both the
proximal and distal outcomes of SLIs. In the first instance, the frequency, duration, mode,
and scope of interfaces, together with associated influence mechanisms, exert a proximal
impact on strategic choices. And ultimately, interfaces will have direct and indirect impacts
on the distal outcomes such as survival, growth, and overall performance. We next provide a
discussion and synthesizing summary of all prior studies using each of these three elements.
Context of SLIs
What is the nature of interdependence? Although interdependence seems to be
central to interface definitions, most of what we know about SLI interdependencies is
inferred from theoretical arguments and interpretations of research findings rather than tests
of specific hypotheses. It is also the case that researchers have (explicitly or implicitly)
considered situations where parties at the interface predominately exhibit pooled, sequential
or reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967).
In terms of the CEO-TMT interface, research most commonly focuses on situations of
sequential interdependence, such as when the TMT depends upon the CEO as a source of
information (Cao et al., 2010), goal direction (Foo, Sin, & Yiong, 2006), and/or values
(Hayibor, Agle, Sears, Sonnenfeld & Ward, 2011). This sequential interdependence between
the CEO and TMT arises in part due to the disproportionate influence of the CEO given their
formal position, power, and status (Carmeli, Schaubroeck, & Tishler, 2011). As the titular
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head, the CEO plays a unique role in motivating, coaching, and rewarding members of the
TMT (Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2005), and in delegating responsibilities to TMT
members (Buyl, Boone, & Hendriks, 2014). The CEO also serves a role as a “disturbance
handler”, intervening to avoid situations of strategic polarisation. For example, in a case
study of two Canadian hospitals, Kisfalvi, Sergi, and Langley (2016) observed a “triangular”
interface pattern, where opposition between two factions was managed by the CEO.
Some other studies have shown that CEOs may sequentially depend on TMT
members as a source of information and advice (Arendt, Priem & Ndofor, 2005), particularly
in making decisions that are novel or expose the firm to high levels of uncertainty (Buyl et
al., 2014; Carmeli, Tishler, & Edmondson, 2012; Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007). CEOs might
also depend on their TMT members as a source of psychological counsel and support. For
example, Mannor, Wowak, Bartkus and Gomez-Mejia (2016: 1975) found that CEOs appoint
decision-making teams whom they “perceive as providing a supportive inner circle,” but only
when facing a loss-making context.
Our review also revealed that the interface between the CEO and TMT is sometimes
characterized by reciprocal interdependencies, particularly in situations where CEOs and
TMT members must operate in unison, such as in dynamic, novel, or uncertain environments.
Lin and Rababah (2014), for example, developed the concept of CEO-TMT exchange quality
to represent the average quality of reciprocity and emotional and social exchange between the
CEO and each of his or her executive peers. Such deep, frequent and reciprocal exchanges
between the CEO and TMT serve as a conduit by which the natural diversity within teams is
leveraged and parlayed to improve decision quality (Lin & Rababah, 2014) and ultimately
firm performance (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011). More broadly, reciprocal
interdependencies are observed in situations where the influence of the CEO on the TMT, or
vice versa, depends upon the receptivity or reaction of the other. As an example of this,
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Stoker, Grutterink, and Kolk (2012) found that efficacy of the CEO’s transformational
leadership style was contingent on the extent to which their TMT members seek feedback.
With respect to the CEO-board interface, while there are clearly situations in which
the CEO and board operate in “parallel universes” (see Boyd et al., 2011 for a review), the
more common pattern of interdependence is sequential. The CEO depends upon the board not
only as a source of decisional authority but also for access to external resources (Sauerwald,
Lin & Peng, 2016). For example, Chen, Ho, and Hsu (2013) found that CEOs in firms
competing on innovation rely on the board in acquiring, comprehending, and mastering
external information and resources. CEOs may also depend, early in their tenure, on the
leadership development activities of board chairs (Shen, 2003), or as a guide for how much
emphasis the CEO should place on socio-emotional wealth in the context of family firms
(Goel, Voordecks, van Gils, & van den Heuvel, 2013). In terms of how CEOs may seek to
influence board perceptions, Westphal (1998) found that when boards became more
structurally independent, CEOs were more likely to use persuasion and ingratiation tactics to
retain more control over compensation policy, while Tuggle and colleagues (2010) find that
CEO duality results in the board reducing its attention to monitoring.
There is also growing evidence of reciprocal interdependence of the CEO and board
of directors. Molinari, Hendryx, and Goodstein (1997), for example, found that effective
governance depends on the ability of the CEO and board of directors to work effectively
together. Westphal (1999) showed that friendship ties between the board and the CEO make
the CEO more likely to rely upon the board for advice and counsel, but at the same time the
performance effect of this advice was stronger when the board simultaneously had put in
place long term incentives or ensured the CEO had higher levels of firm ownership. Wu
(2008) showed that ties between the board and the CEO influence product innovation
performance. Most recently, Cornforth and MacMillan’s (2016) case study indicates the
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boundary between board chair and CEO responsibilities is subject to renegotiation as the
relationship develops, forging a reciprocal relationship between the roles.
Beyond the immediate interfaces among strategic leaders, strategic leaders and
stakeholders can also exhibit interdependencies. Internally, studies have shown how top
managers depend on middle managers as a source of ideas and input to strategy (Ren & Guo,
2011) and as a source of learning and strategic renewal (Sun & Anderson, 2012). To Raes
and colleagues (2007; 2011), managing the interface with middle managers is a key aspect of
strategic leadership because of the “catalytic role” that middle managers play in converting
strategic intent into operational plans. Some studies have shown that middle manager
performance is influenced by the combination of CEO and TMT leadership styles, with each
having both complementary and substitutive effects depending on the configuration (Song,
Zhang, & Wu, 2014). Externally, the dependence of CEOs and TMTs on stakeholders for
resources (Dai, Montabon, & Cantor, 2014) or for knowledge is considered a key basis for
interfaces (Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2010; Heyden et al., 2013).
What demands and imperatives give rise to interfaces? Interdependencies, and the
interfaces they give rise to, are ultimately dictated by task and positional demands
(Hambrick, Finkelstein & Mooney, 2005), strategic and performance challenges that arise
from the organization’s current context (Hambrick, 1994), and contingencies captured by
environmental uncertainty and dynamism (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Early work in contingency theory and organizational design (e.g., Galbraith, 1973)
recognized that a foundational source of interdependence is the type of work performed and
the inherent demands for specialization, coordination, and delegation. Sapienza and Gupta
(1994) found that managers and venture capitalist investors interact more frequently when
there is low goal congruence (due to increased coordination requirements), and less
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frequently when the CEO has more prior start-up experience (and thus the CEO does not
need to rely on the venture capitalist to the same extent for job knowledge). Roberts and
Stiles (1999) provide case evidence to suggest that CEOs and board chairs are jointly
responsible for the development of strategy, “swim in parallel” and seamlessly swap
“swimming lanes” as circumstances dictate. Hambrick and Cannella (2004) explore in detail
the evolution of the chief operating officer (COO) role, and how changes in the amount and
complexity of work of the CEO results in a higher propensity to hire a COO, particularly for
large firms or where the CEO has extraordinary task demands. Similarly, Ren and Guo
(2011) argued in a conceptual paper that middle managers have two essential tasks: to “prescreen” opportunities brought to their attention, and to exploit “policy windows” where these
issues can be sold to upper management, resulting in the activation of the interface.
Other scholars have focused on strategic challenges as setting the context for the
development of SLIs. For example, Huse’s (1998) ethnography provides an indication that
strategic challenges determine the level of communication frequency between leaders with
internal and external stakeholders, and that the source of authority for the board largely
depends upon the relative importance of these stakeholders, and how much they trust each
other. Tulimeri and Banai (2010) argue that new regulatory complexities are driving the
CEO and CFO to work more closely together and to be more equal in power and stature,
while Krotov (2015) comes to a similar conclusion for CIOs in arenas where informational
technology confers competitive advantage. Closely related to strategic challenges, the
deviation (or deterioration) of firm performance from expected standards or aspirations has
also been shown to shape the interfaces, by either inducing the CEO to look for advice
(McDonald & Westphal, 2003), or to perform impression management activities (Westphal,
Park, McDonald & Hayward, 2012). For example, Heyden and colleagues (2013) showed
that when a firm underperforms, the CEO is more likely to seek advice internally.
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Finally, several studies have shown that turbulence and change in the external
environment give rise to more intense interactions and communication flows among strategic
leaders (Nath & Mahajan, 2011; Niehoff, Enz, & Grover, 1990), as well as between strategic
leaders and internal stakeholders. For example, in a study of Chinese CEOs and their
employees, Peng and colleagues (2016) found initial evidence to suggest that the extent to
which CEO intellectual stimulation influenced employee perceptions of work meaningfulness
was more pronounced when the company was performing poorly or was operating in a
dynamic environment. Looking at the role of environmental dynamism specifically, many
studies have considered the theoretical implications of dynamism (e.g., Arendt, Priem, &
Ndofor, 2005; Kim et al., 2009; Waldman & Yammarino, 1999), but few tests have been
performed. The empirical studies available indicate that in dynamic environments directive
leadership styles are more useful for harnessing top management team heterogeneity
(Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007), and CEOs are more likely to seek external advice (Heyden et
al., 2013). Further, industry uncertainty influences the extent to which tenure shapes the
relationship between the CEO and stakeholders (Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2014).
How does the wider social context shape interfaces? Strategic leaders are
embedded within a broader social system and socialized order that sets the context for their
interfaces. From our review, we deduced four key dimensions of the social context that shape
the content of SLIs: hierarchical (the system of formal hierarchical relations in which leaders
are embedded), relational (the broader set of informal interpersonal network ties),
organizational (the setting such as the type of firm or environment in which strategic leaders
are located), and cultural (the cultural norms that govern leader interactions).
First, SLIs are shaped by the hierarchical system of relationships that determines the
distribution of power and allocation of decision-making authority. This is most often
observed in the interface between the CEO and the board, where the balance of power shapes
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the fate of the CEO’s strategic proposals and actions (Deng & Hendrikse, 2015; Yoo & Reed,
2015), and creates the potential for rivalries and conflicts (Wu, 2008). Roberts and Stiles
(1999) noted that the challenge of establishing an effective working relationship between the
CEO and board chair depends on their prior history of interactions. Beyond the board, the
CEO’s position as titular head bestows them with authority to shape the composition of the
TMT and how tasks are allocated (Kisfalvi & Pitcher, 2003; Klimoski & Koles, 2001;
Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009). In turn, the relative distribution of power
within the TMT shapes the dynamics between individual executives, such as the CIO and
CEO (Krotov, 2015), and the CMO and the TMT (Nath & Mahajan, 2011). Finally, the
hierarchical position of middle managers enables them to serve as a key conduit, filter, and
sense-making device for information and events flowing between the lower and top levels
within the organization (Sun & Anderson, 2012). Their formal position also allows them to
play a bridging and brokerage role, by screening or selling opportunities (Ren & Guo, 2011).
Second, it has been widely recognized in past research that strategic leaders are
embedded in a wider system of informal intra-organizational and inter-organizational
relational networks (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006; Chen, 2013; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997;
McDonald & Westphal, 2003). These networks facilitate interface development by giving
leaders portals of access to contacts for advice and information (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For
example, Westphal (1999) found that CEOs with friendship ties to the board of directors were
inclined to confer with the board more often for strategic advice. The external networks of
CEOs also facilitate advice seeking for strategic issues (McDonald & Westphal, 2003), and
serve as a source of social support (Westphal et al., 2012). However, these very same ties can
also hinder the operation of certain interfaces, such as between the board of directors and the
CEO. While Westphal (1999) found no evidence of such an effect, Bruynseels and Cardinaels
(2014) found that audit committees do not monitor CEOs as rigorously when they are friends.
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Third, organizational characteristics, such as the size, stage of development, and
contextual features of the firm have been proposed to have a strong influence on whether and
how frequently leaders come into contact with one another. West and Meyer (1998)
suggested that in younger, entrepreneurial firms, CEOs would have a greater influence on the
TMT than in older, established firms. Similarly, de Jong, Song & Song (2013) proposed that
new ventures lack well-established structures, placing a premium on the role of founder in
shaping interpersonal processes. Most recently, Friedman, Carmeli, & Tishler (2016) noted
that entrepreneurial firms rely heavily on the leadership of the CEO and the TMT in strategic
decision-making, compared to larger, more established organizations. While these arguments
have intuitive appeal, there have been few tests of specific organizational influences on SLIs.
Other scholars have hinted that the social context of family firms facilitates SLI development,
by creating opportunities for interaction and minimizing the need for a formal governance
regime (Pieper, Klein & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zona, 2016). For example, in a study of privateowned family enterprises in Germany, Pieper and colleagues (2008) found that goal
alignment between owners and managers, by serving as a source of informal control, reduced
the need for a board of directors. Similarly, the extent to which the organization emphasizes
collegiality (de Jong et al., 2013), facilitates debate and sharing perspectives (Hmieleski &
Ensley, 2007), and encourages continuous improvement (Adelman, 2012) can facilitate the
development of more seamless interfaces with employees and middle managers.
Fourth, the interfaces of strategic leaders are also shaped by the presence of shared
national cultural values, norms, and belief systems. Aside from the fact that these cultural
influences can limit managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007), variations in
cultural norms may shape the way in which leaders interact (e.g., Bai, Li, & Xi, 2012;
Rodriguez, 2005). For example, Ou and colleagues (2014: 37) pointed out that that
Confucianism and Daoism teach leaders to be self-deprecating and “lead without overtly
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appearing to lead” and find that CEO humility leads to perceptions of empowering
relationship which subsequently influences TMT integration. Interestingly, Li and Tang
(2013) found that the hubris of CEOs appears to be “contagious” in a sample of Chinese
CEOs, but the effect was not present in the US sample, which may be due to the fact that
Chinese are more influenced by their peer group, while Preston, Karahanna, and Rowe (2005)
find the means by which CIOs are able to effectively educate their peers in the TMT differ
between the French and US contexts.
Contact in SLIs
What is intersected at the interface? Because executives inject themselves into
their interactions with others (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), explaining how interfaces create
and confer influence requires accounting for what strategic leader and stakeholder attributes
(demographics and dispositions), aspirations (interests, goals, and preferences), and activities
(actions and role behaviors) are intersected. For the sake of clarity and space, we consider
these intersections for each interface individually (e.g., CEO-TMT, CEO-BOD, etc.).
Intersection of CEOs and TMTs: The single most common study “template” is how
the attributes of CEOs influence TMT activities – in particular the level of behavioral
integration or “teamness” (Hambrick, 1994; Simsek et al., 2005). In our review, we identified
seven studies that examined the influence CEO leadership style (whether charismatic,
empowering or transformational) on the tendency for the TMT to be behaviorally integrated,
and the performance implications thereto (e.g., Carmeli et al., 2011; Simsek et al., 2005; Ling
et al., 2008; Raes, Bruch, and de Jong, 2013). Others have studied the influence of CEO
personality attributes on TMT dynamics and processes (Kisfalvi & Pitcher, 2003; Peterson et
al., 2003). For example, using a novel Q-sort methodology, Peterson and colleagues (2003)
demonstrated how CEO personality traits, such as agreeableness, neuroticism, and
extraversion, impacted the inner workings of the TMT by shaping the level of cohesion,
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flexibility, and group process. Similarly, in a study of technology new ventures, deJong and
colleagues (2013) illustrate how lead founder personality influenced the level of task and
relational conflict in the founding team.
Intersection of CEOs and BODs: There is a similarly robust tradition of examining
the CEO-BOD interface and the activities of the board in mitigating agency conflicts and
altering CEO decision making (Boyd et al., 2011). Many studies have investigated how
boards can play an active role in guiding the CEO’s decision-making and developing their
capabilities (e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Judge and Dobbins, 1995; Shen, 2003). Taking an
evolutionary perspective of the CEO’s tenure, Shen (2003) theorizes how the focus and
dynamics of the board-CEO interface shifts over time. Early in the CEO’s tenure, when the
threat of managerial opportunism is low, the focus of the board is on developing the CEO’s
leadership capabilities. However, as the CEO’s power base grows, the role of the board shifts
to controlling managerial opportunism. Others, such as Chen and colleagues (2013: 381),
have demonstrated how board social capital represents an “important conduit to link firms to
critical information and essential resources” and provides a source of advice for CEOs that
improves their capabilities and decision-making in the context of R&D.
Findings from studies of boards in family settings have revealed that the attributes and
make-up of the board, particularly the presence of outsiders and family members, increases
the extent to which the board’s skills are leveraged by the CEO (Zona, 2016), and whether
the CEO prioritizes family goals (Goel, et al., 2013). Other studies have teased apart how
boards and CEOs both gain power through the appointment of new board members and use
power through their position on the board (Krause & Semadeni, 2014; Roberts & Stiles,
1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal, 1998). Krause and Semadeni (2014) examined the
qualitative differences in CEO-board chair separations and found that the CEO’s career
horizon is associated with the type of separation that occurred. Finally, a succession of
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studies has examined how board monitoring is either aided or impeded by the nature of the
interface between the board and top managers (e.g., Bruynseel & Cardinaels, 2014; Del Brio
et al., 2013; Tuggle et al., 2010). Drawing on social exchange theory, Del Brio and
colleagues (2013) argue that the resource provision and monitoring roles of boards do not
occur in a vacuum but within the context of their interpersonal relations with the CEO.
Positive perceptions of CEO integrity, benevolence, and ability influence the extent to which
directors engage in monitoring and provide resources. Others, however, have shown that
personal relations between the board and executives can undermine the monitoring efficacy
of the board. For example, Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) find consistent evidence that
social ties formed through the network of the CEO reduces audit committee effectiveness.
Intersections of CEOs and individual executives: A growing body of research has
begun to profile the intersection of CEOs and TMTs with individual, specialized functional
executives within the TMT (for a related review, see Menz, 2012). Research on individual
executive interfaces tended to focus on relational dynamics with the CEO, such as the level of
mutual understanding and alignment (Johnson & Lederer, 2005; 2010), relational quality
(Krotov, 2015), interpersonal trust (Zhen, Xuan, & Jing, 2012), social capital (Karahanna &
Preston, 2013), and effectiveness (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). A particularly promising
direction has been studies that unravel the conditions under which functional executives
acquire and maintain structural power and decision-making influence within the TMT (Klaus,
Edvardsson, Keiningham & Gruber, 2014; Nath & Mahajan, 2011).
Intersections of strategic leaders and internal stakeholders: In terms of the internalSLI interfaces, a focus of research has been on the wider implications of CEO and TMT
leadership style throughout the organization (Bai et al., 2012; Berson, Da’as & Waldman,
2015; Huang, Cheng & Chou, 2005; Niehoff et al., 1990; Raes et al., 2013; Sun & Anderson,
2012). For the most part, these studies have traced the implications of CEO’s
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transformational or empowering leadership style for employee outcomes, such as shared
vision (Berson et al., 2015), perceived organizational support (Bai et al., 2012), employeeorganization value fit (Huang et al., 2005), and commitment, satisfaction, and role clarity
(Niehoff et al., 1990). Others have demonstrated how leaders create voice opportunity for
employees through visibility, approachability, and the use of both formal and informal
communication channels (Adelman, 2012), and how the level of behavioral integration at the
TMT level converts into greater levels of productive energy among employees (Raes et al.,
2013). Concerning the TMT-middle manager interface (e.g., Raes et al., 2007, 2011),
research shows that middle manager perceptions of support is influenced by the
complementary leadership styles of the CEO and the TMT (Song et al., 2014).
Intersection of strategic leaders and external stakeholders: Research on the interface
of strategic leaders and external stakeholders has a long tradition in social network theory and
resource dependence theory (for a review, see Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009). While
studies of the external social networks and resource linkage roles of CEOs, TMTs, and board
provide a useful starting point for understanding the strategic leader-external interface, they
have tended to take an aggregate view of the interface without delving into the individual
dynamics between specific strategic leaders and external stakeholders. Although we know
that these linkages represent conduits of information, influences, and resources, relatively few
studies have delved into micro-dynamics of these interfaces.
Some recent studies have begun to shine a light into the black box of the strategic
leader- external stakeholder interface. In a conceptual paper, Fanelli and Misangyi (2006:
1058) theorized how the CEO’s charisma represents a means of influence in the relationship
between the CEO and external stakeholders by affording the CEO “needed salience in the
competition for outsiders’ attention and evaluation.” Empirically, a few studies have
investigated the micro-dynamics of strategic leaders’ external interfaces such as Westphal
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and colleagues’ (2012) study of impression management exchanges between CEOs of
different firms, and how these supportive behaviors influenced the favorability of journalists’
evaluations of CEOs following negative earnings surprises.
What are the manifestations of interface? The manifestations of SLIs can be
described in terms of the frequency of interaction (how often strategic leaders and
stakeholders interact), the mode of interaction (whether interaction is virtual or face-to-face),
and the scope of interaction (whether a series of bilateral exchanges or one all-inclusive
multi-lateral exchange and interaction). Because these variables are rarely specified or
measured, our discussion is limited to inferences based upon author’s arguments and
assumptions to discern the main patterns of SLI manifestations. First, consistent with the
view that the work of strategic leaders is ill-structured and ambiguous (Hambrick, 1989;
Mintzberg, 1973), most authors operate on the assumption that the interface among leaders is
ongoing, with few clear demarcations between episodes of contact (cf., Raes et al., 2011). In
contrast to interfaces among leaders, interfaces of strategic leaders and external stakeholders
are more periodic, and tend to be dictated by exogenous events, such as changes in the
environment or performance shocks. Second, the majority of studies are limited in scope to
bilateral interactions, treating each interface separately. While some studies have tracked the
cascading influence of CEOs on middle managers via TMTs (e.g., Ou et al., 2014), we are
not aware of any studies that examine the multilateral, simultaneous, and reciprocal
interactions of multiple strategic leaders. Finally, despite the proliferation of new forms of
communication, we found very little reference to the mode or channel through which
strategic leaders interact. All told, there has been little attention to the manifestations of SLIs
in terms of frequency, mode, and scope.
What is the nature of influence at the interface? Building on prior theories and
definitions of leadership, a core feature of our definition of SLIs is that they are consequential
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in influencing firm behavior, actions, processes, and outcomes. The concept of influence
mechanisms captures the type, direction, and pattern of that influence.
Influence type: Influence type represents the basis and nature of influence, whether
socio-cognitive (e.g., CEO shaping the mental models of the TMT through sense-making
activities), regulatory (e.g., the board chair improving the self-efficacy of the CEO by setting
challenging goals), political (e.g., CEO lobbying the board for support for a strategic
initiative), behavioral (e.g., CEO coordinating the contributions of TMT members) or
cultural (e.g. CEO enculturating values among employees through role modelling).
To begin, the parties that comprise SLIs often interact for the purposes of sharing,
consolidating, and processing information. To accomplish these goals, the parties engage in
socio-cognitive activities such as information processing, sense making, and sense giving.
Johnson and Lederer (2005) examined the role of communication frequency and channel
richness on the convergence between the CEO and CIO, and found that while communication
frequency predicted convergence, channel richness did not. Consistent with this, Miller,
Hickson and Wilson’s (2008) case analysis illustrates that CEOs and the stakeholders deemed
as “core heavy weights” (high in involvement and influence) can jointly construct the most
salient aspects of a strategic decision. In so doing, they act as carriers and interpreters of the
organizational memory. A range of studies on CEO transformational leadership, have
theorized that CEOs play a critical socio-cognitive role in “intellectually stimulating”
members of the TMT, and the wider organization, to view and frame problems from different
perspectives and to come up with novel solutions to problems (de Jong et al., 2013; Friedman
et al., 2016; Ling et al., 2008; Sun & Anderson, 2012).
Beyond the transfer and interpretation of information, SLIs are a vehicle to motivate
counterparties to collaborate, work together, and share insights. To achieve these objectives,
socio-regulatory activities such as goal regulation, performance monitoring, or empowerment
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can be undertaken. For example, in a study of the relationship between TMT social
integration and organizational ambidexterity, Jansen, George, Van den Bosch and Volberda
(2008) found the effects of social integration were strengthened in the presence of
transformational leaders, who through role modelling behaviors enabled the “synergetic and
integrative efforts of socially integrated teams [to] permeate across hierarchical levels” (p.
990). Bringing middle managers into the picture, Song and colleagues (2014) find that middle
managers who perceive top managers as providing support and social exchange are motivated
to perform better. Furthermore, CEOs who exhibit caring leadership will motivate middle
managers, who will gratefully reciprocate with higher performance and dedication. Taking an
agency perspective, Zona (2014) illustrates that boards play a role in motivating long-tenured
CEOs, otherwise pre-occupied with the status quo, to invest in R&D.
Interface participants may also rely upon socio-behavioral activities such as
mobilizing resources, coordinating actions, developing trust and pro-social actions. For
instance, Simsek and colleagues (2005) demonstrate how collectivistic CEOs create a
collaborative and behaviorally integrated environment for their TMTs. Yucel, McMillan, and
Richard (2014) found that Turkish TMTs express less normative and affective commitment
when their CEOs exhibits moderate levels of transformational leadership in comparison to
low or high levels of transformational leadership. It has also been widely espoused that CEOs
influence their immediate cadre of executives through socio-behavioral means, notably
motivating individuals to cooperate with each other and engage in more intensive exchanges
(Friedman et al., 2016). This is evidenced in the findings of studies, such as Ou and
colleagues (2014), which show that CEO transformational leadership fosters high levels of
TMT integration, with spillover consequences at middle and lower organizational levels.
The use of these behavioral mechanisms within an organization can be so consistent
and pervasive (or not) that it generates a common sense of purpose and culture. These socio-
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cultural mechanisms of influence include discourse, acculturation, and other symbolic
processes which allows the interactions within and between strategic leaders to cascade to the
rest of the organization. For example, Hayibor and colleagues (2011) found that when the
TMT members had similar values to their CEO, they were more likely to perceive the CEO
as charismatic. This alignment of goals and beliefs appears to make it easier for TMT
members to “drink the Kool-aid.” Examining how these influences can affect the greater
organization, Liao and Subramony (2008) showed that to the extent that the senior leadership
team was customer orientated, employees exhibited a similar customer orientation for three
different functional roles (customer contact, production, and support).
Due to the socio-political forces at the interface, parties will often engage in behaviors
to advance or protect their interests. For example, Enns and colleagues’ (2003) study of
influence tactics how CIOs worked to push IT issues further up the agenda and found a wide
range of influence behaviors were used, including rational persuasion, consultation,
ingratiation, personal appeals, exchange, coalition tactics, and pressure. Taking the
perspective of the CEO, Zhang and colleagues (2015) dug deeper into the implications of
transformational leadership and found that individualized attention by transformational
leaders was harmful because it created perceptions of favoritism (group level
transformational leadership behavior had the expected positive effect). Westphal and Zajac
(1995) revealed that the relative balance of power between the CEO and the current board
had a significant influence on whether new board members would be sourced from other
insider- or outsider- dominated boards. Huse (1998) reported that the board’s relationship
with stakeholders was somewhat transitive depending upon the balance of power between the
stakeholders and the top managers.
Influence direction: Influence direction represents whether the direction of influence
is upward (e.g., the TMT influencing the CEO or board), downwards (e.g., the CEO
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influencing employees), or lateral (e.g., the CFO influencing the CMO). Consistent with the
broader literature on strategic leadership, studies on inter-SLI interfaces have examined the
downward influences of CEO behaviors, actions, and leadership styles on top manager,
middle manager, or employee attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes (e.g., de Jong et al., 2013;
Ling et al., 2008; Ou et al., 2014; Simsek et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2015).
A few studies have also considered upward influences and typically fall into two
categories: studies examining how CEOs attempt to directly shape or curry favor with the
board of directors, and studies of the upward influences of middle managers on top managers.
With respect to the former category, Westphal (1998) found that changes in board structure
that increase the board’s independence from management are associated with higher levels of
CEO ingratiation and persuasion behaviors towards board members; and that these upward
influences offset the effect of enhanced board independence on corporate strategy and CEO
compensation. Others, such as Sauerwald and colleagues (2016) have shown how powerful
CEOs can control the director selection process, remove directors, and limit their career
prospects at other firms. In the latter category, a range of studies have shown how middle
managers play a championing role selling issues and opportunities to top managers (Ren &
Guo, 2011). Research on lateral influences typically includes studies of the interface between
individual functional executives and the CEO (e.g., Enns et al., 2003; Krotov, 2015), or
between strategic leaders and external stakeholders (Dai et al., 2014). Finally, studies
examining multi-directional influences are rare, and typically deal with power struggles
between the CEO/TMT and board (e.g., Kor, 2006, Westphal & Zajac, 1995), or push-back
on CEO’s initiatives from the TMT (Costanzo & Di Domenico, 2015).
Influence pattern: By influence pattern, we mean whether the influence of leaders on
others is enabling (e.g., the CEO encourages the TMT to take risks), constraining (e.g., the
board limits the managerial discretion of the CEO), or more complex. For the most part,
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there has been a subtle but prevalent assumption that leaders have an enabling influence by
facilitating the achievement of organizational goals. A focus on the enabling role of CEOs is
particularly typical of studies that examine the socio-regulatory influences of CEO
transformational leadership on TMTs and employees. By engaging in transformational and
charismatic behaviors, CEOs empower their immediate cadre of executives to achieve
ambitious, sometimes audacious, aspirations (Colbert, Kristof-Brown, Bradley, & Barrick,
2008; Jansen et al., 2008; Ling et al., 2008). CEOs can also have an enabling influence on
TMT members by providing the TMT with the latitude to act consistent with their capabilities
(Carmeli & Paulus, 2015), encouraging collaboration (Carmeli et al., 2011; Jansen et al.,
2008), and fostering cohesion (Waldman & Yammarino, 1999). With respect to the CEOboard interface, boards may have an enabling influence on CEOs by engaging in mentoring
activities (Shen, 2003), providing the CEO with the resources to invest in innovation (Chen,
2013). And interfaces between CEOs and external stakeholders may also be enabling by
providing access to information (Luo et al., 2014) and by offering CEOs support under
hostile conditions (Westphal et al., 2012).
However, several studies have also documented how interfaces between strategic
leaders and stakeholders may constrain rather than enable task and goal accomplishment.
The biggest source of constraint is observed at the CEO-board interface, where boards can
potentially limit the latitude of action of CEOs (Judge & Dobbins, 1995), discourage
experimentation (Zona, 2014), veto the CEO’s strategic initiatives and proposals (Deng &
Hendrikse, 2015), and suppress the CEO’s innate predilections (Goel et al., 2013). By
extension, CEOs might also constrain the creativity and ingenuity of the TMT by imposing
their own perspectives (Pitcher & Smith, 2001) or by oversteering TMT members towards the
pursuit of short-term goals (Costanzo & Di Domenico, 2015). Similarly, even as advice
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networks might be enabling, they can also result in cognitive lock-in, making it hard for
CEOs to break out of their modes of thinking (McDonald & Westphal, 2003).
Consequences of SLIs
What are the proximal impacts of interfaces? SLIs have been shown to explain
and predict strategic change and entrepreneurial activity, R&D investment, and decision
quality. Ling and colleagues (2008) found that the CEO transformational leadership
facilitated the development of three different TMT behaviors - decentralization of
responsibilities, a risk-taking propensity, and a long-term compensation philosophy - that in
turn facilitated the pursuit of corporate entrepreneurship. Costanzo and Di Domenico (2015:
502) reported that while the CEO of the venture initially lacked entrepreneurial drive and
imposed existing roles onto the TMT, a “dialectical–paradox” of tension was created via
misfit with the market and ultimately resolved itself through upheaval and strategic change.
Yoo and Reed (2015) found that for TMTs dominated by within-industry hires, the presence
of outside directors was associated with resource substitution strategies in comparison to
resource imitation strategies (which they use as a measure of strategic conformance).
With respect to R&D investment, Chen and colleagues (2013) found board social
capital diminishes the negative relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment and
enhances the positive relationship between CEO education and R&D. Similarly, Chen (2014)
found that powerful CEOs are able to harness the board’s education, industry-specific
experience, and interlocking directorate ties to enhance the level of firm R&D activity.
However, these findings must be tempered in the light of Kor’s (2006) examination of the
power struggles between the TMT and the board of directors. She found negative interactions
between TMT tenure, TMT shared experience, and functional diversity and the outsider
board member ratio when predicting the level of R&D investments.
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Lastly, in terms of decision quality, Raes and colleagues (2011) provides a compelling
summary of the likely effects of the top management team processes on middle management
functioning and the resultant implications for both strategic decision quality as well as the
quality of decision implementation. In an empirical study, Lin and Rababah (2014) find that
CEO-TMT exchange processes correlate with TMT psychological empowerment, which
results in higher quality decisions as assessed by the group. Similarly, Friedman and
colleagues (2016) find that CEO transformational leadership is able to enhance the team’s
decision comprehensiveness through the development of a behaviorally integrated team.
What are the distal impacts of interfaces? Not only are SLIs important for
understanding the strategic choices that leaders make, but also for firm outcomes and
performance. For example, Colbert and colleagues (2008) examine the goal congruence of
the CEO with the TMT and find that transformational leadership does increase goal
congruence, and that this congruence is related to overall organizational performance
(measured by ROA). In the context of new ventures, Hmieleski and Ensley (2007) find that
matching leadership type to the level of environmental dynamism is critical for making the
most of heterogeneous TMTs, with directive leadership resulting in higher performance
(measured by revenue and growth rates) in high dynamism environments, whereas
empowering leadership is better suited for low dynamism environments. Looking at
alignment more generally, Karahanna and Preston (2013) found that alignment between the
CIO and other TMT members on information systems strategy resulted in higher levels of
financial performance. Most recently, Georgakakis and colleagues (in press) find that TMT
fault lines are less detrimental for performance when CEOs have shared experience,
increased career variety, or are similar socio-demographically.
Turning to the relationship between strategic leaders and stakeholders, Balkundi and
Kilduff (2006) theorized that the extent to which a leader plays a role in three networks–the
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ego network, the organizational network and the inter-organizational network– will influence
the efficacy of that leader in achieving desired outcomes (including survival, growth and
innovation). Empirically, these arguments were explored by Luo and colleagues (2014), who
showed that as the CEO progresses through the seasons of their tenure and switches from
mode of learning to one of holding power, the relative emphasis placed on employee and
customer relations changes, and the extent to which these relationships are nurtured has a
significant impact on the overall tenure to performance link.
Collective Synthesis
Reviewing the literature on SLIs is somewhat like trying to navigate the city of Rome
– it is difficult to know where to start and finish, and the sprawling development makes it
challenging to connect insights across the different research streams and theoretical
traditions. Our goal with this review was to endeavour to synthesize key research themes,
concepts and insights across the various sub-fields that constitute this literature. To illustrate
the overall trends across the various themes and concepts in our organizing framework, we
provide a tabular summary in Figure 3 and a representative sample of thirty articles in
Appendix 1 as a summary of the prior work. From Figure 3, we can observe the areas of SLIs
that have received more and less scholarly attention in the literature, and can further deduce
what is known and unknown about SLIs. Building from this descriptive summary which
shows what has (or has not) been studied in detail, we now elucidate some of the key
findings, ambiguities and unknowns in the literature, and potential inconsistencies in the
existing evidence that need resolution.
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --A first major take-away is that studying the attributes, aspirations, and activities of
strategic leaders in isolation can be an inadequate lens to describe, explain, and predict the
influence of strategic leaders. In study after study, we found that leader attributes,
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aspirations, and activities have vastly different consequences depending on what other
attributes, aspirations, and activities they come into contact with. This is illustrated, for
example, in studies that have found that the impact of CEO tenure on R&D intensity varies
depending upon the level of board human and social capital (Chen, 2013; Chen et al., 2013),
that the influence of transformational and empowering CEO leadership on performance
depends upon whether the CEO and TMT members differ in their informational
demographics and tenure (Ling, Wei, Klimoski & Wu, 2015), and that CEO networks are of
greatest benefit to ambidexterity when CEOs and TMTs have a high degree of
communication richness (Cao, Simsek & Zhang, 2010). The results of our review support
our initial intuition that interfaces are the means and conduits through which the aspirations,
attributes, and activities of strategic leaders are animated, come alive, play out, and are
transformed in social settings. This is especially apparent in studies that illustrate how
strategic leaders vary their actions and behaviors based on the traits of other leaders, such as
delegating influence based on functional background expertise or locus of control similarity
(e.g., Buyl, et al., 2014). As an illustration of the pervasive influence of interfaces in
organizational functioning, of the 65 empirical studies where the downward or upward
influence of one party on another were discussed or hypothesized (out of a total of 74
studies, which also include conceptual papers), support for a significant interface-driven
effect was found in the vast majority of the studies.
A second finding is that interfaces are the key conduits and means by which CEO
(and TMT) leadership cascades throughout the wider organization. Most of scholarly
attention on interfaces has been directed to leadership in “close quarters” (Waldman &
Yammarino, 1999), as in the case of CEO-TMT and/or CEO-board interfaces. However, a
growing number of studies examine the interfaces through which leadership spills over and
cascades throughout the entire organization. Leadership cascades through a sequence of
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interfaces in which the CEO influences the TMT, the TMT influences middle managers, and
middle managers influence employees (e.g. Ou et al., 2014; Raes et al. 2013; Song et al.,
2014). Through these and other studies, we have learned that interfaces represent a key
explanatory mechanism through which influence is conveyed, perceptions and impressions
are formed, and by which the attributes, aspirations, and activities of strategic leaders
permeate the wider organization and beyond. Indeed, we located eight studies that
simultaneously considered both interfaces among strategic leaders (CEO, BOD, and TMT)
and other internal or external stakeholders, with several discussing or testing the “knock-on”
effects of one interface on another.
Third, our review sheds light on the ways in which the board of directors can serve as
a constraint, catalyst, and a complement to the CEO and wider TMT. Viewed from the lens
of agency theory, boards are often seen as constraint upon the agency of CEOs (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), limiting the range of actions and behaviors in which they can engage, as
exemplified in Gulati and Westphal’s (1999) study of how distrust between the CEO and the
board can limit the extent to which CEOs engage in alliance formation. But our review also
found that boards can serve as a catalyst, by developing the leadership competences of
CEOs (Shen, 2003), and by improving the action capability of the entire management team
(Kim et al. 2009). Finally, by providing complementary expertise, knowledge, and
resources, boards can serve as a countervailing force against the biases and ingrained habits
of CEOs (Deng & Hendrikse, 2015). As evidence of this balance, we found that while 11
papers exclusively considered the constraining role of the board, another 10 focused on the
potential enabling role that boards play, while others considered both effects in concert.
Fourth, we have learned that it is nearly impossible to separate interfaces, the
interdependencies upon which they are founded, and the social context in which they arise in
the body of existing work. Although our framework provides a clear delineation of these
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elements, many of these concepts are theoretically underdeveloped and are empirically
entangled, rendering the direction of causality ambiguous. So, as much as we would like to
say that these concepts can be parsed into neat, self-containing bundles, further development
of how interfaces emerge from the co-evolution of the task and social context is needed.
Finally, just like the city of Rome, the literature on SLIs is marked by several
contrasts and seemingly paradoxical findings. CEO transformational leadership can empower
and animate key processes, but they can engender dependency and cause disenfranchisement
among some. Social networks between CEOs and boards can improve the flow of
information and create a supportive context, but can hinder the monitoring activities and
vigilance. Middle managers can both facilitate and obstruct the agency of CEOs and top
managers. The literature on top management teams is dominated by the concepts of teamness and collaboration but the literature on the interactions of individual members of these
teams is often framed from the lens of power, politics, and negotiation. To fully understand
these countervailing influences, we need to move beyond considering these facets in isolation
towards more encompassing theories and models to determine which factors can radically
change the implications of interface characteristics such as these—as we discuss next.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Building on our summary of the “big picture themes” related to SLIs, we draw from
the “bird’s eye” view of prior research in Figure 2 and 3 to bring into sharper focus some of
the key ambiguities, blind spots, and “known unknowns” concerning SLIs. First, one blind
spot in our understanding of SLIs is the details of circumstances and context in which they
emerge. While we know that interdependence is a necessary, but not always sufficient
condition, we know considerably less about the nature or substance of these
interdependencies, or how the strategic and social context co-evolve and conspire to shape
the interdependencies. We offer two promising directions to advance understanding on the
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origins and emergent dynamics of SLIs: (1) further developing the construct of
interdependencies and (2) building process models of emergence.
Second, interfaces occur when the attributes, aspirations, and activities of strategic
leaders and other stakeholders come into contact. But our understanding of this contact is
hindered by a dearth of research on the mechanisms through which interfaces convey
influence. We identify four directions to enrich extant understanding of what happens at the
interface: (3) specifying different forms of contact; (4) cross-fertilizing research from other
disciplines to better ground interfaces; (5) paying greater attention to governance
mechanisms; and (6) examining contact more holistically.
Finally, our review has shown that SLIs are consequential for a range of proximal and
distal outcomes. While there is significant scope to extend the range of outcomes studied in
future research, we believe two important directions are to (7) explore the potential dark side
of SLIs, and (8) examine the role of performance feedback processes. Below we discuss each
of these promising future directions in detail. We present a summary of these directions and
selected research propositions in Appendix 2.
Developing Interdependencies
We invoked Thompson’s (1967) taxonomy of pooled, sequential, and reciprocal
interdependence to provide insight as to how SLIs may differ. However, it is possible that a
more nuanced and customized taxonomy of interdependence could provide a renewed basis
for explaining SLI dynamics and processes. Consider four alternative types of
interdependencies: resource (e.g., CEO’s dependence on external stakeholders for access to
resources or funding); informational (e.g., the CEO depends on the CFO for financial
information); decisional (e.g., the TMT relies on the CEO for permission to pursue a strategic
initiative); and psychological factors (e.g., a newly appointed CEO depends on the board for
guidance and support). These interdependencies are not mutually exclusive, and can operate
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simultaneously, in harmony or conflict, in shaping SLIs. Their interactions will likely give
rise to qualitatively different forms and intensities of interfaces. Consider, for example, the
type of interface that might arise between the CEO and board when the CEO depends on the
board for decisional authority versus when the CEO relies on the board for psychological
support and reassurance. By specifying the underlying nature of interdependencies at play,
future research can better explain the emergence and evolution of SLIs.
Building Process Models of Emergence
We also encourage future studies on the development of multi-level process models
that can provide a richer understanding of why and how SLIs emerge. As our review
demonstrates, strategic leaders are nested in a strategic and social context that impose
demands and constraints, which shape whether and to what extent strategic leaders interact
with one another and other parties. Distinct from variance models, process models direct
attention to the “how” and “why” effects, and help to understand the causal relationships
between inputs and outputs (Fischer, Dietz, & Antonakis, 2017). In the case of SLIs, a multilevel account of how strategic imperatives – emanating from the position, organization, and
environment – co-evolve with the social context to create interdependencies would provide a
useful starting point for understanding the genesis of interfaces. Future researchers might
particularly leverage insights from research on micro-foundations of strategy (Felin, Foss &
Ployhart, 2015) to understand how these various “inputs” interact to shape the formation of
SLIs. Methodologically, so doing will require ingenuity both in the choice of research
settings and research designs. In terms of settings, studies in new venture or founding
contexts, or in established firms that have experienced major leadership changes, could
provide useful backdrop to study the formation of interfaces in real-time. In terms of research
design, we encourage in-depth longitudinal case studies, along the lines of Kisfalvi, Sergi,
and Langley’s (2016) study of micro-dynamics, to unpack the processes underpinning

Interfaces of Strategic Leaders

36

formation of SLIs. We also see potential merit in the use of narrative approaches, including
autobiographies, biographies, diaries, and letters to shareholders (Mathias & Smith, 2016).
Specifying Different Forms of Contact
Recognizing the multifaceted forms in which strategic leaders and others engage one
another is essential to developing higher fidelity theoretical accounts of SLI influence
mechanisms and outcomes. From our review, two dimensions of contact seemed worthy of
consideration, but were not examined in sufficient detail by prior studies: temporal and
spatial. The temporal dimension of SLIs refers to the timing, frequency, and duration of
contact (Raes et al., 2011), or whether interfaces are ongoing (no clear demarcation between
periods of contact and non-contact), episodic (well-defined hiatuses between intensive
periods of contact), or punctuated (where long periods of time occur between contact and
non-contact). The temporal dimension would allow for questions to be asked about whether
interface effects are persistent, subject to sharp discontinuities, or exhibit lock-in or
imprinting effects. By contrast, the spatial dimension refers to whether interface captures
contact between leaders that are close or distant. This distance can be considered in multiple
ways, such as hierarchical level, physical, or cultural.
Juxtaposing the temporal and spatial dimensions of contact reveals that “contact” may
take on different forms and meanings, ranging from ongoing contact between strategic
leaders that are physically, hierarchically, or culturally proximate to punctuated contacts that
are physically, hierarchically, or culturally distant. In so doing, future research can alleviate
the risks of construct misspecification and omission by providing a more comprehensive
profile of the variety of different forms of contacts under the conceptual umbrella of SLIs,
particularly in relation to subtler and less observable interfaces, such as between CEOs and
employees. Above all, by defining interfaces in terms of their temporal and spatial
parameters, future researchers can achieve better methodological fit by aligning measurement
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and time lag features of research design with the properties of different interfaces, reducing
the risk of Type II errors arising from measuring interfaces at the wrong level or time. This is
one area where the literature on SLIs could benefit from greater adoption of observational
and ethnographic approaches. Although ethnographic methods are extremely time
consuming, they can offer deep insights through “studying events, language, rituals,
institutions, behaviors, artifacts, and interactions” (Cunliffe, 2010: 227). Network
ethnography, which combines well-established social network analysis with a set of
ethnographic techniques (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, & Sydow, 2016), may be helpful in
capturing detailed interface process across the right actors at the right time intervals.
Opportunities for Cross-fertilization
In further grounding and conceptualizing periods of contact, we suggest that crossdisciplinary research may also give us “new ways of seeing” SLIs by providing new
constructs, tools, and vocabulary to more accurately conceptualize and capture the dynamic
characteristics of SLIs (Shaw, 2017). Some of the greatest advances in studies of strategic
leadership have come from “retrofitting” constructs in psychology, such as shared mental
models, core self-evaluations, and executive values (Hambrick, 2007). Indeed, because
interfaces are relational constructs, synthesizing research on organizational behavior and
psychology is a natural way forward. By way of example, in a recent review of the
psychology literature on relationship science, Finkel, Simpson, and Eastwick (2017) deduced
fourteen principles, many of which have relevance to SLIs. The principle of integration,
refers to “opportunities and motivations for interdependence tend to facilitate cognitive,
affective, motivational, or behavioral merging between partners” (p. 387). Parallel concepts
such as maintenance (exhibition of cognitions and behaviors that promote the relationship’s
persistence over time), diagnosticity (situations that allow partners to evaluate one another’s
true goals and motives), and uniqueness (the unique patterns that emerge when partners’
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qualities intersect) also seem readily applicable. Moreover, sociological research on how
economic power and social position translate to political influence (Walker & Rea, 2014),
and the connections between business and political elites (Mizruchi & Marshall, 2016) can
help researchers study the political interfaces of CEOs, boards, and top executives. The
institutional context of the country in which strategic leaders embedded can also shape the
content, dynamics, and types of SLIs (Olie, van Iterson, & Simsek, 2013).
Attention to Governing Mechanisms
While much is known about the mechanisms through which leaders in close proximity
influence one another, we know less about how these mechanisms play out when parties to
the interface are distant, such as the cascading influence of CEOs – either directly or
indirectly – on employees. Although there is evidence that these effects exist, greater
attention is required to understand the mechanisms and channels by which CEO persona and
leadership style influences employees throughout the organization, and precisely which
mechanisms are at play. The dominant focus has been indirect mechanisms, such as the role
of organizational climate (Berson et al., 2015), reputation (Men, 2012), and productive
energy (Raes et al., 2013). Less attention has been devoted to the direct channels, such as
individual interactions between CEOs and employees, and visibility of CEOs to employees.
Although such periods of contact may be short and infrequent, they represent opportunities
for the CEO to shape employee perceptions through role modelling and symbolic behaviors.
One specific direction might be to study the concept of CEO visibility to employees,
defined as the extent to which CEO actions and behaviors are visible to rank-and-file
employees. Another related possibility is to examine the mechanisms by which CEO and
TMT behaviors and processes “leak out” from the executive suite. Explaining how the ‘tone
at the top’ cascades requires greater attention to the informational and influence channels
through which employees, at various hierarchical levels, make sense of leadership behaviors.
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Holistic Approaches to Examining Contact
Prior research on SLIs have typically investigated each interface in isolation, except
for some recent studies that look at cascading leadership effects inside organizations. While
this is understandable given the theoretical and methodological challenges entailed in
studying phenomena at the interface, there is a need for theoretical models that examine SLIs
in a more integrated and holistic fashion. It is logical, for example, to expect that the interface
of the CEO and the board of directors will have spillover consequences for the interface of
the CEO and the TMT. And by extension, the interface of the CEO and TMT will have
consequences for the interface of the TMT and middle managers. One specific possibility
would be to examine whether the level of information exchange and collaboration between
the chair and independent directors influences the level of information exchange and
collaboration between the CEO and members of the TMT. Does collegiality and
collaborative behavior cascade? Or similarly, does a lack of goal alignment between the
CEO and the board chairman have spillover consequences for the interface of the CEO and
the TMT? Another direction to take is to examine the circumstances under which the board
of directors hinders the interface of the CEO and TMT, perhaps by commanding a
disproportionate share of the CEO’s attention, or by interfering in key strategic processes.
Exploring Potential Dark Sides
For the most part, research has tended to focus on the enabling role, or “bright side”
of SLIs. While our review also documents the constraining influence of SLIs, we are not
aware of focused studies that have considered the potential negative consequences. Although
interfaces are purposive to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, resources, advice, and
support, the fact that they engender dependence might lead to power struggles that could slow
down decision-making or otherwise hinder the quality of decision-making. It is also possible
that interdependence, particularly of a psychological variety, might have a range of
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dysfunctional outcomes, as well as the potential for ethical or legal lapses. From a modularity
perspective, systems composed of tightly coupled components are more susceptible to
disruption and a threshold level of instability that can cascade out of control (Perrow, 1984).
Interfaces might, thus, act as “carriers” of contagion effects, such as a dysfunctional
personality traits or negative interactions, such as executive narcissism and hubris, “leak out”
from the executive suite and become acculturated in the wider organization and beyond.
Modeling Feedback Processes
A convenient assumption in most treatments of SLIs is that they have reached a
steady rate of equilibration, in which the level of interdependence, influence mechanisms,
and outcomes have crystallized (Simsek et al., 2015). But SLIs can also operate in a more
fragile state of equilibrium and can be transformed by feedback processes. As an example,
consider the issues of how a deviation from performance aspirations might shift the interface
between the CEO and the board, or the board and external stakeholders. A performance
deviation, either positive or negative, might alter the interface by increasing or decreasing the
level of interdependency, or by altering the attributes, aspirations, and activities of
leaders/stakeholders party to the interface. Leadership traits and emotions, such as aggression
or anxiety that otherwise remain latent might be activated because of feedback processes.
This activation may then destabilize the interface. Thus, greater attention to feedback
processes in SLIs is clearly warranted.
Conclusions
In closing, the theme of the 77th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management,
“At the Interface,” provided an opportune time to reflect upon, and to rejuvenate decades of
rich but scattered inquiry on SLIs. To that end, we first provided an encompassing definition
to anchor studies across levels, units, and theories. Second, we advanced a framework to
organize and synthesize what is currently known, or knowable about SLIs from extant
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research. Based on the framework and review, we finally highlighted several direction ripe
for further theorizing and testing. Together, we are hopeful that the review will help to
establish SLIs as the next frontier of strategic leadership research and reaffirm their
importance for understanding how and why executives do what they do to shape firm
behavior and performance.
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ENDNOTES
1

Example based on DRW Technologies case (Greyser & Ellet, 2015; Harvard Business

School Publishing).
2

Specifically, biology, chemistry, physics, computer science, mathematics, sociology,

psychology, geography, economics, and marketing.
3

The Web of Science searches were performed between October and November 2016.

4

Our third criteria, party interdependence, could not be deduced from abstract or title

information alone. This is considered in the final step.
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Table 1
Representative Definitions of Interfaces
Author / Year
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Hillman & Keim
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Souder (1996)
Araujo, Dubois
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Zaccaro &
Klimoski (2002)
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Albers,
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Rau, Moslein, &
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Author / Year
Nel et al. (2009)

Type of
Interface
Interorganizational
interface
Businessgovernment
interfaces
R&D/Marketing
Interface
Resource
interfaces
Leader-Team
Interface

Inter-functional
interfaces
Top
management
team-middle
manager
interface
Crossfunctional
interfaces
Alliance
Interfaces
Modular system
interfaces
Knowledge
interfaces

Discipline
Biochemistry

Management Definitions of Interfaces
Definition of Interface
“Interface is defined as the contact point between relatively autonomous organizations which are interdependent and interacting as they seek to cooperate to achieve some
larger system objective. Interface is proposed as a research tool aiding understanding of interorganizational problems” (p. 69)
“One way of thinking about variation in the government- business interface is to view some actors in the political process as demanders and others as suppliers of public
policies, and some institutions in the process on the demand side and others on the supply side. Different institutional settings may affect the interaction of the actors and
institutions and subsequent public policy outcomes in systematic ways” (p . 199)
The interface is defined in terms of extra-functional communication – the interpersonal transfer of information. Develops a model of information utility based on the
receiver’s perception of the comprehensibility, credibility, relevance, and novelty of information.
“Resource interfaces are primarily concerned with the technical interdependencies that arise when the resource bases of buyer and supplier are connected through exchange
activities.” (p. 499)
“We refer to the various ways that leadership and team processes become intertwined so as to influence collective performance. At is basic level, the interface can refer to
the direct effect of each set of processes on performance (e.g., leadership processes influencing team performance; team processes influencing leader effectiveness). At a
higher level, leadership and team processes can affect one another and be affected by prior collective performance. At the most complex level, leadership and team
processes can be inextricably integrated such that the boundaries of each set of processes become fairly indistinct” (p. 6)
“An inter-functional interface is a set of boundary-spanning activities across which two (or more) functions are assigned some measure of collective responsibility and
engage in a set of integration efforts” (p. 178)
“We conceptualise the interface of the TMT and MMs as a place where the separate worlds of the TMT and MMs intersect, characterized by an alternation of episodes of
contact during which interaction or “interface processes” take place, and periods of no contact during which TMT and MMs act on their own on the basis of assumptions,
expectations, and roles. A critical postulate in the interface model is that what happens during the episode of contact influences what happens in the periods without
contact” (p. 103)
Cross-functional integration at the marketing-operations interface: “Functional integration across the two domains refers to how operations and marketing communicate
and coordinate their activities in order to align them towards common goals” (p. 392)
“The interface between partners can vary in strength, that is, the number and type of boundary spanners involved, the number of connections among them, and the intensity
of their interaction. We can term these parameters of interface strength the scope, density, activity” (pp. 9-11).
“Interfaces, in general, prescribe how two components or service providers in a modular system mutually interact” (p. 175)
“At established interfaces among actors of different functions, knowledge sharing is part of actors’ primary task within the innovation process and is determined by
specialization. Actors’ interdependence is based on specialization and division of labor at the newly emerging interfaces, actors not being part of the original and formally
defined innovation process are integrated to improve innovation processes’ output” (p. 341-342)
Cross-Disciplinary Definitions of Interfaces
Definition of Interface
“The ‘nano–bio’ interface comprises the dynamic physicochemical interactions, kinetics and thermodynamic exchanges between nanomaterial surfaces and the surfaces of
biological components (for example proteins, membranes, phospholipids, endocytic vesicles, organelles, DNA and biological fluids).” (p. 543)
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Chemistry

“Simulation results have indicated the dynamic nature of the interfaces in which the peptides move on and off the silica surface, effectively spending a certain fraction of
time in close contact with the surface” (p. 430)

Engineering

The boundary between two phases such as two immiscible liquids, a liquid and vapour or gas, a gas and a solid, or a gas and a vapour or gas. The interfacial area is the area
of the boundary between the two phases. The interfacial tension is the surface tension at the surfaces between two phases.
The zone of interaction between two systems or processes. Estuaries are the interfaces between fluvial and marine systems.
“The interface between convergent plates produces most of the world’s largest earthquakes” (p. 1)

Geography
Geology

Berenson (1968)

Marketing

Murray &
Habul (2011)

Information
Systems

Encyclopaedia
Britannica

Physics

“Along the subduction interface, the transition between subducted segments corresponds to differences previously noted in the depth of microseismicity , predicted thermal
profiles, tomographically defined slab morphology and long-term net forearc uplift over multiple seismic cycles.” (p. 3)
“An interface can be defined as a common boundary between systems. Chemists and chemical engineers have developed a fairly well structured and eminently useful body
of knowledge about the transfer of materials and energy across an interface” (p. 9)
We use the terms computer interface and interface as defined by Benyon, Turner, and Turner (2005) to refer “those parts of the system with which people come into
contact physically, perceptually and conceptually” (p. 12). Physical contact includes pushing buttons and clicking on the functional features of the interface (e.g., radio
buttons, pull down menus and hyperlinks). Perceptual contact refers to what the user sees. Conceptual contact refers to the user’s efforts to try to work out what the
interface does and what it should be doing, including messages from the device that help the user to figure it out. From this general perspective, the interface is an integral
part of how people interact with computer systems and, thus, understanding how small changes in the functional design of the interface affect use and preference is
important to the management of information systems”
Interface, surface separating two phases of matter, each of which may be solid, liquid, or gaseous. An interface is not a geometric surface but a thin layer that has properties
differing from those of the bulk material on either side of the interface. A common interface is that between a body of water and the air, which exhibits such properties
as surface tension, by which the interface acts somewhat like a stretched elastic membrane. Interfacial effects, or processes that occur at interfaces, include the evaporation
of liquids, the action of detergents and chemical catalysts, and the adsorption of gases on metals.
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Figure 1
Article Review Process
Step 2:

Step 1:
Progeny (citation) search of Hambrick & Mason (1984):
Articles that focus on strategic leaders and how they
accomplish their goals - a subset will consider SLIs

2,476 articles
71 ultimately retained

Combined Keyword Search:
The net result of searching for articles with over 50
distinct keyword combinations, provided below

Step 1 Located Articles

Step 2 Located Articles

2,121 articles
50 ultimately retained

Consolidation Process
Duplicates across the search populations removed

Initial framework

Articles at risk for review

Duplicates

430 articles

Excluded

3,966 articles

4,167 articles

Step 3:
Validation Process - Rater Agreement
A subset of ~20% of the population
examined for coding consistency
Overall agreement = 91%
ICC (2,1) = .85 (absolute agreement)
ICC (2,3) = .94 (consistency)
Fleiss’ kappa = 84.5%

Screening Process
Title / abstract reviewed using two criteria:
1. multiple parties present and 2. evidence of contact

Initial coding guide

Articles at risk for coding

201 articles, 4.8% yield

Step 4:
Validation Process – Ancestry Search
Reference search and analysis of articles
cited by at least 10% of coded population
5,164 articles referenced
40 articles met criteria
1 additional article located

Coding Process
Articles coded and categorized using 25
dimensions, coding guide iteratively updated

Final population and framework
122 articles, 60.2% yield

Excluded

80 articles

Coding revealed 80 non-interface articles:
26 single party
24 no interface (e.g., perceptions)
8 non-executive populations
22 other (e.g., reviews, un-locatable)
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Figure 2
A General Framework for Strategic Leader Interfaces (SLIs)
CONTEXT
Why do interfaces occur?

What is the nature of
interdependence?
•Pooled
•Sequential
•Reciprocal

What demands and imperatives
give rise to interfaces?
•Job demands
•Strategic challenges
•Dynamism

What is the wider social context
of interfaces?
•Hierarchical
•Relational
•Organizational
•Cultural

CONTACT
What happens at these interfaces?

What is intersected at the interface?
•Attributes (experience, leadership style,
personality, dispositions, demographics)
•Aspirations (interests, goals, preferences)
•Activities (emergent states, team processes)

What are the manifestations of interfaces?
•Frequency of interaction (ongoing, periodic)
•Scope of interaction (bilateral, multi-lateral)
•Mode of interaction (face-to-face, virtual)

What is the nature of influence at the
interface?
•Influence type (cognitive, regulatory,
behavioral, cultural, political)
•Influence direction (up, down, lateral)
•Influence pattern (enabling, constraining)

CONSEQUENCES
What are the impacts of interfaces?

What are the proximal impacts of
interfaces?
•Strategic choice and chnage
•R&D investment
•Strategic decision-making quality
•Organizational behavior and
dynamics

What are the distal impacts of
interfaces?
•Firm performance
•Firm growth
•Firm innovation
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Figure 3
Descriptive Summary of Interface Studies

Consequences

Contact

Context

Category
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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30
31
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Pooled
Sequential
Reciprocal
Job demands
Demands and
Strategic challenges
imperatives
Dynamism
Hierarchical
Relational
Social context
Organizational
Cultural
Inter-SL
Parties present
SL-Internal
SL-External
Downwards
Upwards
Influence direction
Lateral
Multidirectional
Constraining
Enabling
Influence pattern
Multiple
Unclear
Socio-cognitive
Socio-regulatory
Influence
Socio-behavioral
mechanisms
Socio-cultural
Socio-political
Strategic change
R&D investment
Proximal outcomes
Decision quality
Other
Performance
Distal outcomes
Other
Number of Blank Cells:
Form of
interdependence
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2
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0
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0
1
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28
0

3

2
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0
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1
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5
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Count
22
56
30
7
11
12
31
31
18
23
85
25
21
59
15
26
17
18
60
27
12
20
39
15
1
39
7
3
5
13
28
3

Unique
Articles
108

28

94

122

117

117

84

28

31

Interpreting Figure 3: For example, reading off column 7 (which pertains to hierarchical social contexts), 26 articles exclusively focused on this context, while 2 articles examined the interplay of
hierarchical and relational context jointly (see row 8, col. 7). Similarly, 19 of the 31 articles were focused on downward influence direction (row 14, col. 7), but only four considered upward
influence direction (row 15, col. 7). Finally, the bottom row of the table indicates how many rows are blank, indicating no study in our sample considered the two sub-aspects of the framework
simultaneously based on our coding.
Notes:
1.
The count column represents unique articles in that category, and therefore the rows will not sum to the total count since articles can be counted more than once.
2.
Articles coded to more than three categories within a certain group (e.g., socio-cognitive, socio-behavioral, and socio-political) are not counted in this table.
3.
Red colored cells indicate where no articles are present. Grey cells are for mutually exclusive categories or for dependent variables that are rarely studied simultaneously.
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Appendix 1
Summary of Representative Interface Articles
Author /
Year
Friedman,
Carmeli, &
Tishler (2016)

Method
Crosssectional
survey

Research Context /
Sample
Random sample of 324
small firms that applied for
a loan through Israel's SME
Fund. Cross-industry
sample

Key Findings / Arguments
CEO transformational leadership is positively associated
with TMT behavioral integration, which mediates the
relationship between CEO transformational leadership
and strategic decision comprehensiveness. In turn,
comprehensiveness mediates the relationship between
behavioral integration and organizational capability to
adapt.
Firms with high external board social capital will have
greater excess CEO returns when the CEO has more
power. Powerful CEOs are able to weaken the negative
effects of internal board social capital on CEO excess
returns.

Sauerwald,
Lin, & Peng
(2016)

Longitudinal
archival

8197 firm-year observations
of publicly held US
corporations included in the
RiskMetrics Directors
universe between 1999 and
2010

Mannor,
Wowak,
Bartkus, &
Gomez-Mejia
(2016)
Costanzo &
Di Domenico
(2015)

Multi-method
(survey,
interview,
archival)

84 top executives and 154
unique strategic decisions in
US firms. Gathered data on
anxiety from CEO spouse

CEOs use TMTs for social buffering, but only when the
top executive is facing a loss context.

Longitudinal
case study

CEO’s lack of risk-taking intrapreneurialism and
imposition of TMT roles and structures better suited to
the larger parent company initially constrain change
processes. However, ‘dialectical–paradox’ tensions are
created and resolved through upheaval, resulting in a
change in strategic direction

Lin &
Rababah
(2014)
Ou, Tsui,
Kinicki,
Waldman,
Xiao, & Song
(2014)

Crosssectional
survey
Multiple
survey

Single UK company start-up
venture observed over two
years with 20 interviews of
multiple TMT members
supplemented with
ethnographic observation
and organizational
documents
210 Jordanian Firms with
responses at the TMT level
only
Survey data gathered twice
from 328 TMT members
and 645 middle managers in
63 private companies in
China

Bruynseels &
Cardinaels
(2014)

Longitudinal
archival
design

CEO-TMT exchange leads to TMT empowerment,
which in turn results in higher levels of decision quality
(the mediating relationship is supported)
CEO humility was positively associated with CEO
empowering leadership. In turn, CEO empowering
leadership was related positively to TMT integration,
which subsequently predicted empowering
organizational climate. This in turn was positively
related to middle manager work engagement, affective
commitment, and job performance.
Social ties formed through the friendship network of the
CEO (i.e., via other activities) reduces audit committee
effectiveness. However, not all connections are
detrimental, because the negative impact was not
observed for social ties formed between a CEO and their
audit committee through employment or education

Three Board-Ex derived
samples depending on the
dependent variable: 10,922
firm-years for audit effort,
3,187 for going-concern
opinions, 7,283 for internal
controls

Interface
Context
Parties
Hierarchical CEO-TMT

Direction
Downwards

Influence
Pattern
Mechanisms
Enabling
Socio-political;
Socio-cognitive;
Socio-regulatory

Outcomes
Decision quality;
Adaptability

CEO-BOD

Upwards

Enabling

CEO-TMT

Lateral

Enabling

Cultural

CEO-TMT

Multidirecti
onal

Constraining

Relational;
Cultural

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-political;
Socio-cognitive

Decision quality

Cultural

CEO-TMT
TMTInternal

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-cognitive;
Socio-regulatory;
Socio-behavioral

Employee
outcomes

Relational

CEO-BOD

Upwards

Enabling

Socio-regulatory

Strategic change
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Krause &
Semadeni
(2014)

Longitudinal
archival
study

352 separations of CEO /
board chair roles, using
firms in the Corporate
Library database which
draws from Fortune 1000 /
S&P 1500

Chen (2013)

Longitudinal,
archival
design
Crosssectional
survey

876 firm-year observations
of Taiwanese electronics
firms
323 new ventures in
technology industries

Heyden,
Doorn,
Reimer, Van
den Bosch, &
Volberda
(2013)

Crosssectional
survey

Raes, Bruch,
& De Jong
(2013)

Crosssectional
survey

Song, Zhang,
& Wu (2014)

Crosssectional
survey

3,518 firms in the
Netherlands from a variety
of different industries, with
manufacturing, services,
construction and transport
all being at least 10% of the
sample
191 top management team
members and 5048
employees in 63 German
organizations
Sample of 608 middle
managers, 140 top
managers, and 40 CEOs in
China

Westphal,
Park,
McDonald, &
Hayward
(2012)

Longitudinal
survey

Carmeli,
Tishler, &
Edmondson
(2012)

Crosssectional
survey

Jong, Song, &
Song (2013)

Sampling frame of midsized US companies with
>$100MM in sales; 367
CEOs over 16 quarterly
spells from 2004 - 2007,
with 5 years of rolling data
(meaning 9 years of data
altogether)
Sampling frame of 500
alumni from Israeli
executive MBA program, of
which 77 CEOs responded
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Poor performance increases the likelihood of a demotion
separation of CEO-board chair positions (i.e., becoming
CEO only). Also found evidence to suggest that dual
CEO chairs who become a chair only have the shortest
career horizon, while those who become CEO only have
the longest career horizons. Totally exiting CEOs are
somewhere in between.
The reduction in R&D intensity at early and late stages
of CEO tenure is less prominent for boards with high
levels of human / social capital
Several findings, including:
(1) CEO Openness increases TMT task conflict but
decreases relationship conflict
(2) CEO Neuroticism increases TMT relationship
conflict but has no effect on task conflict
(3) CEO Extraversion decreases TMT relationship
conflict but has no effect on task conflict
(4) CEO Agreeableness increases TMT task conflict but
has no effect on relationship conflict
(5) CEO Conscientiousness leads to lower levels of
TMT task and relationship conflict
Environmental dynamism increases external advice
seeking, while firm underperformance increases internal
advice seeking. Evidence suggest that TMT
heterogeneity is negatively related to CEO external
advice seeking and positively related to internal advice
seeking.

Hierarchical

CEO-BOD
chair

Lateral

Multiple

Relational

CEO-BOD

Downwards

Multiple

Socio-political;
Socio-regulatory

R&D investment

Hierarchical

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-political;
Socio-cognitive

Firm
performance

Hierarchical
; Relational

CEO-TMT
CEOInternal
CEOExternal

Upwards

Enabling

Socio-political

TMT behavioral integration also impacts employee
outcomes of job satisfaction and turnover intentions both
directly as well as through its impact on productive
energy.
CEO caring leadership weakens the relationship between
team-level top managerial support and middle manager
performance. CEO authoritative and task-oriented
leadership appears to strengthen the relationship
between top manager support and middle manager
performance.
CEOs who previously received impression management
support from a fellow CEO will be more likely to
provide that support to the fellow CEO, another CEO in
the same industry,
particularly if the focal CEO is aware that the fellow
CEO has helped others in the past.

Hierarchical

TMTInternal

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-political;
Socio-cognitive;
Socio-regulatory

CEOInternal
TMTInternal

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-cognitive

Relational

CEOExternal

Lateral

Enabling

Socio-regulatory

Relational leadership of the CEO leads to TMT trust
which explains learning from failures and decision
quality

Relational

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-behavioral

Employee
outcomes

Decision quality
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Ren & Guo
(2011)

Conceptual

with a sufficient number of
their TMT members
N/A

Raes,
Heijltjes,
Glunk, & Roe
(2011)
Buyl, Boone,
Hendriks, &
Matthyssens
(2011)

Conceptual

N/A

Crosssectional
survey

Sample of 32 Belgian and
Dutch IT companies from a
sampling frame of 206 firms

Hayibor,
Agle, Sears,
Sonnenfeld, &
Ward (2011)

Multi-sample
crosssectional
survey

Ling, Simsek,
Lubatkin, &
Veiga (2008)

Crosssectional
survey

Two survey samples: 253
CEOs and their TMTs and
CEOs of 79 companies and
non-profit organizations
located in the United States.
Sampling frame of 795 New
England SMEs, of which
152 firms with matched
CEO / TMT samples were
available

Raes, Glunk,
Heijltjes, &
Roe (2007)

Longitudinal
case study

Longitudinal case study of a
public Dutch TMT over a
six month period of
observation

Arendt, Priem,
& Ndofor
(2005)

Conceptual

N/A

Hambrick &
Cannella
(2004)

Longitudinal
archival
study

3168 firm-year observations
of 404 firms in 21 industries
available in D&B book of
corporate management
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Argues that the two functions of middle managers are to
pre-screen opportunities and that they will also be
strategic in how they sell these issues to top
management.
Argues that information exchange, mutual influencing,
TMT role behavior, and MM role behavior are salient
aspects of the MM-TMT interface.

Hierarchical

TMTInternal

Upwards

Multiple

Socio-political

TMTInternal

Multidirecti
onal

Multiple

Socio-political;
Socio-regulatory

Decision quality;
Firm
performance

The relationship between TMT diversity and
performance is negative for generalist CEOs and
founder CEOs. However, when CEOs and TMTs share
past experience, they tend to do perform better. There is
evidence to suggest that information exchange and
diversity may partially explain these effects.
Top management team members who reported that
their values were generally similar to those of their
CEO were more likely to report that their CEO
demonstrated charismatic leadership.

Organizatio
nal

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-political;
Socio-regulatory

Firm
performance

Cultural

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Unclear

Socio-behavioral

Transformational leadership imparts a number of
characteristics on the TMT, including behavioral
integration, responsibility decentralization, risk-taking
propensity, and LT compensation philosophy. All
behaviors except for behavioral integration were
subsequently linked to corporate entrepreneurship
TMT sense-making about leadership contains three
elements: (a) image of middle managers and their
leadership expectations;
(b) self-image and preferred leadership approaches, and
(c) the relationship between the two as a basis for action
Argued that as environmental dynamism increases,
CEOs will be more likely to rely on informal advisory
systems for information and advice in making strategic
decisions.
Further, CEOs of organizations pursuing cost leadership
and defender strategies should tend to rely more on their
organizations’ formal advisory systems for information
and advice in making strategic decisions while
differentiation and prospector strategies tend to rely
more on an informal advisory system.
No evidence that industry dynamism (operationalized in
multiple ways) was related to the presence of COOs, but
extraordinary organizational task demands will prompt a
CEO to have a COO, we found a strong effect from
company size. Interestingly, CEOs who have COOs
deliver lower performance than those who do not

Cultural

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Enabling

Socio-political;
Socio-cognitive;
Socio-regulatory;
Socio-behavioral

Hierarchical

TMTInternal

Downwards

Unclear

Socio-political;
Socio-regulatory

Relational

CEOInternal
CEOExternal

Upwards

Enabling

Socio-political

Hierarchical

CEO-Exec

Downwards

Constraining

Socio-political

Strategic change

Firm
performance
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Peterson,
Smith,
Martorana, &
Owens (2003)

Multi-method
(archival, qsort)

Observations of chief
executive officer (CEO)
personality and TMT
dynamics for 17 CEOs

McDonald &
Westphal
(2003)

Multi-method
(survey,
archival)

241 firms in the industrial
and service sectors from the
Forbes list

Enns, Huff, &
Higgins
(2003)

Multi-method
(interviews,
survey)

69 matched pair CIOs and
other executives in
Canadian and US firms

Shen (2003)

Conceptual

N/A

Roberts &
Stiles (1999)

Interviews

In-depth interviews with 30
chairmen/chief executive
dyads in large UK public
companies

Westphal
(1999)

Multi-method
(survey,
archival)

Survey of 243 CEOs and
564 outside directors.

Zajac, &
Westphal
(1996)

Longitudinal
archival

491 directors who were also
CEOs for firms listed in the
Forbes and Fortune 500 lists
for 1986, with data collected
from 1985 - 1992 inclusive

58
CEO Conscientiousness related to team-level concern
for legalism and sense of control over the environment.
CEO emotional stability related to team cohesion,
intellectual flexibility, and leader dominance.
CEO Neuroticism not significantly related to team risk
taking.
CEO Agreeableness significantly related to team-level
cohesion and decentralization of power.
CEO Extraversion was significantly related to the group
process measure of leader strength or dominance.
CEO Openness was significantly related to team risktaking and team intellectual flexibility.
When CEOs are in low performing firms, they seek
more advice from their friends and people with the same
industry experience. In particular, to the extent to which
they get information from their friends less strategic
change will occur and the level of change is less effected
by poor performance.
CIO relational persuasion and personal appeal are
positively associated with CIO influence, however
exchange and pressure are influence tactics that are
negatively associated with influence.
Argues that boards need to provide CEO development
opportunities early in tenure, and then transition to
monitoring later - if this happens, increased performance
will result. To that end, boards should use behaviorbased compensation, rather than outcome-based
compensation early in CEO tenure and modify approach
as tenure increases.
The division of CEO and board responsibilities - notably
concerning strategy and external relationships is
ambiguous and complex. Negotiation of responsibilities
is shaped by founding conditions of the relationship,
both at the firm level, and in terms of the history of the
personal relationship.
CEO-board friendship ties are positively related to the
level of advice and counsel interactions on strategic
issues. As CEO ownership or longer-term incentive
plan compensation increased, the negative effects of
friendship ties on board monitoring grew weaker, and
the positive effect of such ties on advice interactions
grew stronger.
For boards that alter the outsider ratio, whether the CEO
is also a board member, or change the structure of CEO
compensation, their directors of that board are more
likely to go to similar boards in the future.

Relational

CEO-TMT

Downwards

Multiple

Relational

CEOExternal
CEOInternal

Lateral

Constraining

Hierarchical

TMT-Exec

Lateral

Multiple

Hierarchical
; Relational

CEO-BOD

Downwards

Multiple

Hierarchical

CEO-BOD
Chair

Lateral

Enabling

Relational

CEO-BOD

Downwards

Enabling

Relational

BODExternal

Lateral

Constraining

Firm
performance

Socio-political;
Socio-regulatory

Strategic change

Socio-cognitive;
Socio-regulatory

Firm
performance

Firm
performance
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Appendix 2
Potential Future Research Directions
Key Opportunities
Better understand the conditions
that give rise and shape the
structure of SLIs

Future Research Direction

Select Propositions

Developing interdependencies:
Move past useful, but limiting conceptualizations of interdependence to capture not
only the directionality, but the basis of dependence between parties.

P1: Reciprocal interdependence is more likely to characterize an SLI interface if more
than one interdependence type (resource, informational, decisional, and psychological) is
present compared to only one interdependence type.
P2: Informational interdependence is positively associated with psychological
interdependence in later periods, with this effect being stronger at the CEO-TMT than the
TMT-MM interface.

Generate “new ways of seeing”
by constructing or importing
constructs, tools, and vocabulary

Develop understanding of the
wider implications of SLIs and
the impact of performance
feedback processes on SLIs

Building process models of emergence: Using case and narrative approaches,
develop higher fidelity accounts of how the strategic and social context co-evolve
to shape the genesis and emergence of interfaces.

P3: The co-evolution of environmental dynamism (strategic context) with a collectivistic
cultural orientation (social context) leads to psychological interdependencies, which in
turn promotes socio-regulatory influence mechanisms in the CEO-board interface.

Specifying different forms of contact: Identifying the main types and manifestations
of contact based on temporal (ongoing, episodic, punctuated) and spatial
dimensions (close, distant). Deploying observational and ethnographic techniques
to observe SLI contact “in the wild”

P4: Ongoing, close contact between the CEO and the board chair during the early stages
of CEO/board chair tenure fosters trust and goal alignment and is conducive to the
development of routines that facilitate subsequent punctuated distant contact.

Opportunities for cross-fertilization: Find suitable constructs from related
disciplines and resituate them in the SLI nomological network to more accurately
describe the processes that unfold at the interface.

P5: The level of CEO-BOD diagnosticity (situations where partners can evaluate one
another’s true goals and motives) moderates the relationship between board monitoring
and firm performance such that the relationship is less positive at higher levels of
diagnosticity.

Attention to governing mechanisms:
Determine what micro-processes are the underlying basis for cascading effects and
determine the conditions that facilitate or hamper the presence of these second
order effects.

P6: CEO transformational leadership is related to employee commitment through two
mechanisms: a) direct contact with front line employees, and b) through promulgation of
employee-centric employee policies.

Holistic approaches to examining contact: Consider multiple interfaces
simultaneously and assess how they can complement, counter-act, or nullify each
other.
Exploring potential dark-sides: Greater attention to the constraints created by SLIs,
as well as interfaces as carriers and amplifiers of negative behaviors.

P7: As the level of board monitoring of the CEO increases, the a) quantity and b) quality
of CEO-TMT exchanges will decrease.
P8: Ongoing and frequent communication and information exchange between the CEO
and TMT may reduce the opportunity and motivation of CEO and/or TMT members to
seek external advice and information, accelerating groupthink.
P9: Episodic, distant contact between the CEO and board of directors may slow down the
pace of decision-making, inhibiting the ability of firms to seize external opportunities
(i.e., those investment projects requiring approval at board level)

Modeling feedback processes: Examining the impact of past performance on the
stability of SLIs through feedback processes.

P10: Performance below aspirations increases the degree of interdependency between the
CEO and board of directors; CEO and top management team; and top management team
and middle managers.

